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Abstract
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community.
The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other
members, to select the member with the highest number of nominations. This seemingly trivial goal
becomes challenging when there is an additional impartiality constraint, requiring that no single member
can influence her chance of being selected. Recent progress has identified impartial selection rules
with optimal approximation ratios. Moreover, it was noted that worst-case instances are graphs with
few vertices. Motivated by this fact, we propose the study of additive approximation, the difference
between the highest number of nominations and the number of nominations of the selected member, as
an alternative measure of the quality of impartial selection.
Our positive results include two randomized impartial selection mechanisms which have additive
approximation guarantees of Θ(
√
n) and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n) for the two most studied models in the liter-
ature, where n denotes the community size. We complement our positive results by providing negative
results for various cases. First, we provide a characterization for the interesting class of strong sample
mechanisms, which allows us to obtain lower bounds of n− 2, and of Ω(√n) for their deterministic and
randomized variants respectively. Finally, we present a general lower bound of 2 for all deterministic
impartial mechanisms.
1 Introduction
We study the problem that arises in a community of individuals that want to select a community member that
will receive an award. This is a standard social choice problem [7], that is typically encountered in scientific
and sports communities but has also found important applications in distributed multi-agent systems. To give
an entertaining example, the award for the player of the year1 by the Professional Footballers Association
(PFA) is decided by the members of PFA themselves; each PFA member votes the two players they consider
the best for the award and the player with the maximum number of votes receives the award. Footballers
consider it as one of the most prestigious awards, due to the fact that it is decided by their opponents. In
distributed multi-agent systems, leader election (e.g., see [2]) can be thought of as a selection problem of
similar flavor. Other notable examples include the selection of a representative in a group [10], funding
decisions based on peer reviewing [10] or even finding the most popular user of a social network [1].
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The input of the problem can be represented as a directed graph, which we usually call nomination
profile. Each vertex represents an individual and a directed edge indicates a vote (or nomination) by a
community member to another. A selection mechanism (or selection rule) takes a nomination profile as
input and returns a single vertex as the winner. Clearly, there is a highly desirable selection rule: the one
which always returns the highest in-degree vertex as the winner. Unfortunately, such a rule suffers from
a drawback that is pervasive in social choice. Namely, it is susceptible to manipulation. In particular, the
important constraint that makes the selection challenging is impartiality. As every individual has a personal
interest to receive the award, selection rules should take the individual votes into account but in such a way
that no single individual can increase his/her chance of winning by changing his/her vote. The problem,
known as impartial selection, was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin [12] and Alon et
al. [1]. Unfortunately, the ideal selection rule mentioned above is not impartial. Consider the case with
a few individuals that are tied with the highest number of votes. The agents involved in the tie might be
tempted to lie about their true preferences to break the tie in their favor.
Impartial selection rules may inevitably select as the winner a vertex that does not have the maximum
in-degree. Holzman and Moulin [12] considered minimum axiomatic properties that impartial selection
rules should satisfy. For example, a highly desirable property, called negative unanimity, requires that an
individual with no votes at all, should never be selected. Alon et al. [1] quantified the efficiency loss with
the notion of approximation ratio, defined as the worst-case ratio of the maximum vertex in-degree over the
in-degree of the vertex which is selected by the rule. According to their definition, an impartial selection
rule should have as low approximation ratio as possible. This line of research was concluded by the work of
Fischer and Klimm [10] who proposed impartial mechanisms with the optimal approximation ratio of 2.
It was pointed out in [1, 10], that the most challenging nomination profiles for both deterministic and
randomized mechanisms are those with small in-degrees. In the case of deterministic mechanisms, the
situation is quite extreme as all deterministic mechanisms can be easily seen to have an unbounded approx-
imation ratio on inputs with a maximum in-degree of 1 for a single vertex and 0 for all others; see [1] for
a concrete example. As a result, the approximation ratio does not seem to be an appropriate measure to
classify deterministic selection mechanisms. Finally, Bousquet et al. [6] have shown that if the maximum
in-degree is large enough, randomized mechanisms that return a near optimal impartial winner do exist.
We deviate from previous work and instead propose to use additive approximation as a measure of
the quality of impartial selection rules. Additive approximation is defined using the difference between
the maximum in-degree and the in-degree of the winner returned by the selection mechanism. Note that
deterministic mechanisms with low additive approximation always return the highest in-degree vertex as the
winner when his/her margin of victory is large. When this does not happen, we have a guarantee that the
winner returned by the mechanism has a close-to-maximum in-degree.
Our contribution. We provide positive and negative results for impartial selection mechanisms with additive
approximation guarantees. We distinguish between two models. In the first model, which was considered
by Holzman and Moulin [12], nomination profiles consist only of graphs with all vertices having an out-
degree of 1. The second model is more general and allows for multiple nominations and abstentions (hence,
vertices have arbitrary out-degrees).
As positive results, we present two randomized impartial mechanisms which have additive approxima-
tion guarantees of Θ(
√
n) and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n) for the single nomination and multiple nomination models,
respectively. Notice that both these additive guarantees are o(n) functions of the number n of vertices. We
remark that an o(n)-additive approximation guarantee can be translated to an 1 +  multiplicative guar-
antee for graphs with sufficiently large maximum in-degree, similar to the results of [6]. Conversely, the
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multiplicative guarantees of [6] can be translated to an O(n8/9)-additive guarantee2. This analysis further
demonstrates that additive guarantees allow for a more smooth classification of mechanisms that achieve
good multiplicative approximation in the limit.
Our mechanisms first select a small sample of vertices, and then select the winner among the vertices that
are nominated by the sample vertices. These mechanisms are randomized variants of a class of mechanisms
which we define and call strong sample mechanisms. Strong sample mechanisms are deterministic impartial
mechanisms which select the winner among the vertices nominated by a sample set of vertices. In addition,
they have the characteristic that the sample set does not change with changes in the nominations of the
vertices belonging to it. For the single nomination model, we provide a characterization, and we show that
all these mechanisms should use a fixed sample set that does not depend on the nomination profile. This
yields a n − 2 lower bound on the additive approximation guarantee of any deterministic strong sample
mechanism. For randomized variants, where the sample set is selected randomly, we present an Ω(
√
n)
lower bound which indicates that our first randomized impartial mechanism is best possible among all
randomized variants of strong sample mechanisms. Finally, for the most general multiple nomination model,
we present a lower bound of 2 for all deterministic mechanisms.
Related work. Besides the papers by Holzman and Moulin [12] and Alon et al. [1], which introduced impar-
tial selection as we study it here, de Clippel et al. [9] considered a different version with a divisible award.
Alon et al. [1] used the approximation ratio as a measure of quality for impartial selection mechanisms.
After realizing that no deterministic mechanism achieves a bounded approximation ratio, they focused on
randomized mechanisms and proposed the 2-PARTITION mechanism, which guarantees an approximation
ratio of 4 and complemented this positive result with a lower bound of 2 for randomized mechanisms.
Later, Fischer and Klimm were able to design a mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of
2, by generalizing 2-PARTITION. Their optimal mechanism, called PERMUTATION, examines the vertices
sequentially following their order in a random permutation and selects as the winner the vertex of highest
degree counting only edges with direction from “left” to “right.” They also provided lower bounds on the
approximation ratio for restricted inputs (e.g., with no abstentions) and have shown that the worst case
examples for the approximation ratio are tight when the input nomination profiles are small.
Bousquet et al. in [6] noticed this bias towards instances with small in-degrees and examined the problem
for instances of very high maximum in-degree. After showing that PERMUTATION performs significantly
better for instances of high in-degree, they have designed the SLICING mechanism with near optimal asymp-
totic behaviour for that restricted family of graphs. More precisely, they have shown that, if the maximum
in-degree is large enough, SLICING can guarantee that the winner’s in-degree approximate the maximum
in-degree by a small error. As we discussed in the previous section, the SLICING mechanism can achieve an
additive guarantee of O(n8/9).
Holzman and Moulin [12] explore impartial mechanisms through an axiomatic approach. They investi-
gate the single nomination model and propose several deterministic mechanisms, including their MAJORITY
WITH DEFAULT rule. MAJORITY WITH DEFAULT defines a vertex as a default winner and examines if there
is any vertex with in-degree more than dn/2e, ignoring the edge from the default vertex. If such a vertex
exists, then this is the winner; otherwise the default vertex wins. While this mechanism has the unpleasant
property that the default vertex may become the winner with no incoming edges at all, its additive approx-
imation is at most dn/2e. Further to that, they came up with a fundamental limitation of the problem: no
impartial selection mechanism can be simultaneously negative and positive unanimous (i.e., never selecting
2The authors in [6] do not provide additive guarantees, hence we based our calculations on their provided bounds on the
multiplicative guarantee 1 + . It is important to note however that they claim that they have not optimized their parameters, so it
is possible that this guarantee can be further reduced by a tighter analysis.
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as a winner a vertex of in-degree 0 and always selecting the vertex of in-degree n− 1, whenever there exists
one).
Mackenzie in [15] characterized symmetric (i.e., name-independent) rules in the single nomination
model. Tamura and Ohseto [17] observed that when the demand for only one winner is relaxed, then
impartial, negative unanimous and positive unanimous mechanisms do exist. Later on, Tamura [16] charac-
terized them. On the same agenda, Bjelde et al. in [5] proposed a deterministic version of the permutation
mechanism that achieves a 2 bound by allowing at most two winners. Alon et al. [1] also present results for
selecting multiple winners.
Finally, we remark that impartiality has been investigated as a desired property in other contexts where
strategic behaviour occurs. Recent examples include peer reviewing [3, 13, 14], selecting impartially the
most influential vertex in a network [4], linear regression algorithms as a means to tackle strategic noise [8],
and more.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of n ≥ 2 agents. A nomination graph G = (N,E) is a directed graph with
vertices representing the agents. The set of outgoing edges from each vertex represents the nominations of
each agent; it contains no self-loops (as, agents are not allowed to nominate themselves) and can be empty
(as an agent is, in general, allowed to abstain). We write G = Gn for the set of all graphs with n vertices
and no self-loops. We also use the notation G1 = G1n to denote the subset of G with out-degree exactly 1.
For convenience in the proofs, we sometimes denote each graph G by a tuple x, called nomination profile,
where xu denotes the set of outgoing edges of vertex u in G. When we are restricted only in graphs in G1,
for simplicity xu denotes a single vertex. For a vertex u ∈ N , we use the notation x−u to denote the graph
(N,E \ ({u}×N)) and, for the set of vertices U ⊆ N , we use x−U to denote the graph (N,E \ (U ×N)).
We use the terms nomination graphs and nomination profiles interchangeably.
The notation δS(u,x) refers to the in-degree of vertex u in the graph x taking into account only edges
that originate from the subset S ⊆ N . When S = N , we use the shorthand δ(u,x) and if the graph is clearly
identified by the context we omit x too, using δ(u). We denote the maximum in-degree vertex of graph x as
∆(x) = maxu∈N δ(u,x) and, whenever x is clear from the context, we use ∆ instead.
A selection mechanism for a set of graphs G′ ⊆ G, is a function f : G′ → [0, 1]n+1, mapping each
graph of G′ to a probability distribution over all vertices (which can be potential winners) as well as to the
possibility of returning no winner at all. A selection mechanism is deterministic in the special case where
for all x ∈ G′, (f(x))u ∈ {0, 1} for all vertices u ∈ N .
A selection mechanism is impartial if for all graphs x ∈ G′, it holds (f(x))u = (f(x′u,x−u))u for every
vertex u ∈ N and every possible nomination x′u of vertex u. In words, the probability that u wins must be
independent of the set of its outgoing edges.
Let E [ δ(f(x)) ] be the expected in-degree of f on x, i.e. E [ δ(f(x)) ] =
∑
u∈N (f(x))uδ(u,x). We
call a selection mechanism f α(n)-additive if
max
x∈Gn
{∆(x)− E [ δ(f(x)) ]} ≤ α(n),
for every n ∈ N.
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3 Upper Bounds
In this section we provide randomized selection mechanisms for the two best studied models in the literature.
First, in Section 3.1 we propose a mechanism for the single nomination model of Holzman and Moulin [12],
where nomination profiles consist only of graphs with all vertices having an out-degree of 1. Then, in
Section 3.2 we provide a mechanism for the more general model studied by Alon et al. [1], which allows for
multiple nominations and abstentions.
3.1 The RANDOM k-SAMPLE Mechanism
Our first mechanism, RANDOM k-SAMPLE, forms a sample S of vertices by repeating k times the selec-
tion of a vertex uniformly at random with replacement. Any vertex that is selected at least once belongs
to the sample S. Let W := {u ∈ N \ S : δS(u,x) ≥ 1} be the set of vertices outside S that are
nominated by the vertices of S. If W = ∅, no winner is returned. Otherwise, the winner is a vertex in
arg maxu∈W δN\W (u,x). We note here the crucial fact that the selection of the sample set S is independent
of the profile x.
Impartiality follows since a vertex that does not belong to W (no matter if it belongs to S or not) cannot
become the winner and the nominations of vertices in W are not taken into account for deciding the winner
among them. We now argue that, for a carefully selected k, this mechanism also achieves a good additive
guarantee.
Theorem 1. For k = Θ(
√
n), the RANDOM k-SAMPLE mechanism is impartial and Θ(
√
n)-additive in the
single nomination model.
Proof. Consider a nomination graph and let u∗ be a vertex of maximum in-degree ∆. In our proof of the
approximation guarantee, we will use the following two technical lemmas.
Lemma 1. If u∗ ∈W , then the winner has in-degree at least ∆− k.
Proof. This is clearly true if the winner returned by RANDOM k-SAMPLE is u∗. Otherwise, the winner w
satisfies
δ(w,x) ≥ δN\W (w,x) ≥ δN\W (u∗,x) = δ(u∗,x)− δW (u∗,x) ≥ ∆− k.
The first inequality is trivial. The second inequality follows by the definition of the winner w. The third
inequality follows since W is created by nominations of vertices in S, taking into account that each vertex
has out-degree exactly 1. Hence, δW (u∗,x) ≤ |W | ≤ |S| ≤ k.
Lemma 2. The probability that u∗ belongs to the nominated set W is
Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] =
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− 1
n
)k
.
Proof. Indeed, u∗ belongs to W if it does not belong to the sample S and instead some of the ∆ vertices
that nominate u∗ is picked in some of the k vertex selections. The probability that u∗ is not in the sample is
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ] =
(
1− 1
n
)k
, (1)
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i.e., the probability that vertex u∗ is not picked in some of the k vertex selections. Observe that the proba-
bility that some of the ∆ vertices that nominate u∗ is picked in a vertex selection step assuming that u∗ is
never selected is ∆n−1 . Hence, the probability that some of the ∆ vertices nominating u
∗ is in the sample
assuming that u∗ 6∈ S is
Pr [ δS(u
∗,x) ≥ 1|u∗ 6∈ S ] = 1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k
. (2)
The lemma follows by the chain rule
Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] = Pr [ u∗ 6= S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≥ 1 ]
= Pr [ δS(u
∗,x) ≥ 1|u∗ 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ]
and equations (1) and (2).
By Lemmas 1 and 2, we have that the expected degree of the winner returned by mechanism RANDOM
k-SAMPLE is
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] · (∆− k) =
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− 1
n
)k
(∆− k)
≥
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− k
n
)
(∆− k) >
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)
(∆− 2k)
= ∆− 2k −
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k
(∆− 2k)
The second inequality follows by Bernoulli’s inequality (1 +x)r ≥ 1 + rx for every real x ≥ −1 and r ≥ 0
and the third one since n > ∆. Now, the quantity
(
1− ∆n−1
)k
(∆− 2k) is maximized for ∆ = n−1+2k2k+1 to
a value that is at most n+1k+1 − 2. Hence,
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆− 2(k − 1)− n+ 1
k + 1
.
By setting k ∈ Θ(√n), we obtain that E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆−Θ(√n), as desired.
3.2 The SIMPLE k-SAMPLE Mechanism
In the most general model, we have the randomized mechanism SIMPLE k-SAMPLE, which is even simpler
than RANDOM k-SAMPLE. Again, SIMPLE k-SAMPLE forms a sample S of vertices by repeating k times
the selection of a vertex uniformly at random with replacement. The winner (if any) is a vertex w in
arg maxu∈N\S δS(u,x). We remark that, for technical reasons, we allow S to be a multi-set if the same
vertex is selected more than once. Then, edge multiplicities are counted in δS(u,x). Clearly, SIMPLE k-
SAMPLE is impartial. The winner is decided by the vertices in S, which in turn have no chance to become
winners. Our approximation guarantee is slightly weaker now.
Theorem 2. For k =
⌈
41/3n2/3 ln1/3 n
⌉
, mechanism SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is impartial and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n)-
additive.
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Proof. Let u∗ be a vertex of maximum in-degree ∆. If ∆ ≤ k, SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is clearly Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n)-
additive. So, in the following, we assume that ∆ > k. Let C be the set of vertices of in-degree at most
∆− k− 1. We first show that the probability Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ] that some vertex of C is returned
as the winner by SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is small.
Notice that if some of the vertices of C is the winner, then either vertex u∗ belongs to to the sample set
S or it does not belongs to S but it gets the same or fewer nominations compared to some vertex u of C.
Hence,
Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ]
≤ Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x) for some u ∈ C s.t. u 6∈ S ]
≤ Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ∧ u 6∈ S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x) ]
= Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗, u 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ] (3)
We will now bound the rightmost probability in (3).
Claim 1. For every u ∈ C, Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗ 6∈ S, u 6∈ S ] ≤ exp
(
− k3
2n2
)
.
Proof. Assuming that u∗ and u do not belong to the sample set S, we will express the difference δS(u∗,x)−
δS(u,x) as the sum of independent random variables Yi for i ∈ {1, ..., k}. Variable Yi indicates the con-
tribution of the i-th vertex selection to the difference δS(u∗,x) − δS(u,x). In particular, Yi is equal to 1,
−1, and 0 if the outgoing edges of the i-th vertex selected in the sample set points to vertex u∗ but not
to vertex u, to vertex u but not to vertex u∗, and either to none or to both of them, respectively. Hence,
δS(u
∗,x)− δS(u,x) =
∑k
i=1 Yi with Yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and
E [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ] = (∆− δu(u∗,x)− δ(u,x) + δu∗(u,x)) k
n− 2 ≥
k2
n
.
Notice that for the computation of the expectation, we have used the facts that ∆−δu(u∗,x) vertices besides
u∗ have outgoing edges pointing to u∗, δ(u,x)−δu∗(u,x) vertices besides u∗ have outgoing edges pointing
to u, and each of them is included in the sample set with probability kn−2 . The inequality follows since
δ(u,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 and δu(u∗,x), δu∗(u,x) ∈ {0, 1}.
We will now apply Hoeffding’s bound, which is stated as follows.
Lemma 3 (Hoeffding [11]). LetX1, X2, ..., Xt be independent random variables so thatPr [ aj ≤ Xj ≤ bj ] =
1. Then, the expectation of the random variable X =
∑t
j=1Xj is E[X] =
∑t
j=1 E[Xj ] and, furthermore,
for every ν ≥ 0,
Pr [ X ≤ E[X]− ν ] ≤ exp
(
− 2ν
2∑t
j=1 (bj − aj)2
)
.
In particular, we apply Lemma 3 on the random variable X = δS(u∗,x) − δS(u,x) (assuming that
u∗, u 6∈ S). Note that t = k, aj = −1 and bj = 1, and recall that E [X ] ≥ k2n . We obtain
Pr [ δS(u
∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ] = Pr [ X ≤ 0 ] ≤
(
−E [X ]
2
2k
)
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≤ exp
(
− k
3
2n2
)
,
as desired.
Using the definition of E [ δ(w,x) ], inequality (3), and Claim 1, we obtain
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ (∆− k) · (1−Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ])
≥ (∆− k)
(
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ]−
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗, u 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ]
)
≥ (∆− k)
(
1− 1
n
)k
− (∆− k)
(∑
u∈C
(
1− 2
n
)k
· exp
(
− k
3
2n2
))
≥ (∆− k)
(
1− k
n
)
− (∆− k) · n · exp
(
− k
3
2n2
)
≥ ∆− 2k − n2 · exp
(
− k
3
2n2
)
. (4)
The last inequality follows since n ≥ ∆. Setting k =
⌈
41/3n2/3 ln1/3 n
⌉
, (4) yields E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆ −
Θ
(
n2/3 ln1/3 n
)
, as desired.
4 Lower Bounds
In this section we complement our positive results by providing impossibility results. First, in Section 4.1,
we provide lower bounds for a class of mechanisms which we call strong sample mechanisms, in the single
nomination model of Holzman and Moulin [12]. Then, in Section 4.2, we provide a lower bound for the
most general model of Alon et al. [1], which applies to any deterministic mechanism.
4.1 Strong Sample Mechanisms
In this section, we give a characterization theorem for a class of impartial mechanisms which we call strong
sample mechanisms. We then use this characterization to provide lower bounds on the additive approx-
imation of deterministic and randomized mechanisms that belong to this class. Our results suggest that
mechanism RANDOM k-SAMPLE from Section 3.1 is essentially the best possible randomized mechanism
in this class.
For a graph G ∈ G1 and a subset of vertices S, let W := WS(G) be the set of vertices outside S
nominated by S, i.e. W = {w ∈ N \ S : (v, w) ∈ E, v ∈ S}. A sample mechanism3 (g, f) firstly selects
a subset S using some function g : G1 → 2N \ {∅}, and then applies a (possibly randomized) selection
mechanism f by restricting its range on vertices in W ; notice that if W = ∅, f does not select any vertex.
We say that the mechanism is randomized if g uses randomization in the selection of S, otherwise it is
deterministic (even if f uses randomization).
This definition allows for a large class of impartial mechanisms. For example, the special case of sam-
ple mechanisms with |S| = 1 (in which, the winner has in-degree at least 1), coincides with all negative
3For simplicity we use the notation (g, f) rather the more precise (g, f(g)).
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unanimous mechanisms defined by Holzman and Moulin [12]. Indeed, when |S| = 1, the set W in never
empty and the winner has in-degree at least 1. This is not however the case for |S| > 1, where W could be
empty when all vertices in S have outgoing edges destined for vertices in S and no winner can be declared.
Characterizing all sample mechanisms is an outstanding open problem. We are able to provide a first step,
by providing a characterization for the class of strong sample mechanisms. Informally, in such mechanisms,
vertices cannot affect their chance of being selected in the sample set S.
Definition 1. (Strong sample mechanisms) We call a sample mechanism (g, f) with sample function g :
G1 → 2N strong, if g(x′u,x−u) = g(x) for all u ∈ g(x), x′u ∈ N \ {u} and x ∈ G1.
The reader may observe the similarity of this definition with impartiality (function g of a strong sample
mechanism satisfies similar properties with function f of an impartial selection mechanism). The following
lemma describes a straightforward, yet useful, consequence of the above definition.
Lemma 4. Let (g, f) be a strong sample mechanism and let S ⊆ N . For any nomination profiles x,x′ with
x−S = x′−S , if S \ g(x) 6= ∅ then S \ g(x′) 6= ∅.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that S \ g(x′) = ∅, i.e., the sample vertices in x′ are
disjoint from S. Then, by Definition 1, g(x) remains the same as outgoing edges from vertices in S should
not affect the sample set. But then, S \ g(x) = ∅, which is a contradiction.
In the next theorem, we provide a characterization of the sample function of impartial strong sample
mechanisms. The theorem essentially states that the only possible way to choose the sample set must be
independent of the graph.
Theorem 3. Any impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism (g, f) selects the sample set indepen-
dently of the nomination profile, i.e., for all x,x′ ∈ G1, g(x) = g(x′) = S.
Proof. Consider any sample mechanism (g, f) and any nomination profile x ∈ G1. It suffices to show that
for any vertex u, and any deviation x′u, the sample set must remain the same, i.e., g(x′u,x−u, ) = g(x). If
u ∈ g(x), this immediately follows by Definition 1. In the following, we prove two claims that this is also
true when u /∈ g(x); Claim 2 treats the case where u is a winner of a profile, while Claim 3 treats the case
where u is a not a winner.
Claim 2. Let (g, f) be an impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism and let x be a nomination pro-
file. Then the sample set must remain the same for any other vote of the winner, i.e., g(x) = g(x′f(x),x−f(x))
for any x′f(x) ∈ N \ f(x).
Proof. Let w = f(x) be the winner, for some nomination profile x. We will prove the claim by induction
on δ(w,x).
(Base case: δ(w,x) = 1) Let S = g(x) be the sample set for profile x. Assume for the sake of
contradiction that when w changes its vote to x′w, the sample for profile x′ = (x′w,x−w) changes, i.e.,
g(x′) = S′ 6= S. We first note that impartiality of f implies that w = f(x′). Next, observe that the vertex
voting for w in S must be also in S′; otherwise, w becomes a winner without getting any vote from the
sample set, which contradicts our definition of sample mechanisms. We will show that this must be the case
for all vertices in S.
To do this, we will expand two parallel branches, creating a series of nomination profiles starting from
x and x′ which will eventually lead to contradiction. Figure 1 depicts the situation for x and x′.
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a b
w
s s′
(a) profile x
a b
w
s s′
(b) profile x′
Figure 1: The starting profiles x and x′ in Claim 2. Red denotes the winner, while green dashed vertices
denote the members of the sample sets S and S′, respectively.
We start with the profile x′. Consider a vertex s′ ∈ S′ \ S. We create a profile z′ in which all vertices
in S′ \ s′ vote for s′ (i.e., zv = s′, for each v ∈ S′ \ s′), vertex s′ votes for w (i.e., zv = w), while the rest
of the vertices vote as in x′ (i.e., zv = xv, for each v 6∈ S′). For illustration, see Figures 2a and 2b. By the
definition of a strong sample mechanism, we obtain g(z′) = g(x′), since only votes of vertices in S′ have
changed. Notice also that f(z′) = w, as this is the only vertex outside S′ that receives votes from S′. We
now move to profile x and apply the same sequence of deviations, involving all the vertices in S′. These
lead to the profile z, which differs from z′ only in the outgoing edge of vertex w.
a b
w
s s′
(a) profile z
a b
w
s s′
(b) profile z′
a b
w
s s′ v
(c) profile y
a b
w
s s′ v
(d) profile y′
Figure 2: Profiles z and z′ in the base case of the proof of Claim 2: if v = s′ then s′ /∈ g(z) and since
this is the only vertex voting for w, w cannot win in z, while it must be the winner in z′ —a contradiction.
Profiles y and y′: if s′ ∈ g(y), we let s′ vote for v and v for w, making w the winner in y′ but not in y.
Red denotes the winner, while green dashed vertices denote the members of the sample sets S and S′. A red
solid diamond denotes a vertex that cannot win and a green/light diamond denotes a vertex that cannot be in
the sample.
By Lemma 4, there is a vertex v ∈ S′ such that v /∈ g(z). If v = s′, then we end up in a contradiction.
This is because f(z) 6= w, since s′ is the only vertex voting for w in z′ and s′ is not in the sample,
while f(z′) = w, as stated by the other branch and since, when w deviates to x′w, the created profile is
(x′w, z−w) = z′ contradicting impartiality (see Figures 2a and 2b).
We are now left with the case where s′ ∈ g(z) and v 6= s′. Starting from z and z′, we will create profiles
y and y′ (see Figures 2c and 2d) as follows: we construct y by letting s′ vote towards v (i.e., ys′ = v), v
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vote towards w (i.e., yv = w) and yi = zi for all other vertices i 6= v, s′. By the strong sample property,
when s′ votes towards v the sample set is preserved, i.e., v cannot get in the sample. Also, when v votes, v
cannot get in the sample (by a trivial application of Lemma 4); therefore, v 6∈ g(y). Hence, w cannot be the
winner as its only incoming vote is from v, a vertex that does not belong to the sample set g(y).
Starting from z′, we create similarly y′ by letting s′ vote towards v (y′s′ = v), v to vote towards w
(y′v = w) and y′i = zi for all other vertices i 6= v, s′. In this case, S′ will be preserved as sample set in
profile y′ (i.e. g(y′) = S′). Therefore, w is the only vertex voted by the sample set and must be the winner,
leading to a contradiction (see Figures 2c and 2d).
(Induction step) Assume as induction hypothesis that, for all profiles x ∈ G1, it holds g(x) = g(x′w,x−w)
when δ(w,x) ≤ λ, for some λ ≥ 1. Now, consider any profile x where f(x) = w and δ(w,x) = λ + 1
and assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some graph x′ = (x′w,x−w) where g(x′) = S′ 6= S.
Without loss of generality, let δS(w,x) ≤ δS′(w,x′).
Starting from x′, we create profile z′, by letting all vertices in S′ vote for some s′ ∈ S′ and s′ vote for w,
i.e., z′v = s′ for each vertex v ∈ S′ \ {s′} and z′s′ = w. The strong sample property implies that g(z′) = S′
and f(z′) = w. We focus now on profile x, and create the profile z, by performing the same series of
deviations, i.e., by letting all vertices in S′ \ s′ vote for s′ and s′ vote for w. Note, here, that z differs from
z′ only in the outgoing edge of w. Like before, Lemma 4 establishes that there will be some vertex v ∈ S′
such that v /∈ g(z), i.e., g(z) 6= S′. Turning our attention back to z′, we let w deviate towards xw, creating
profile (xw, z′−w). Observe that (xw, z′−w) = z. Since δ(w, z′) < δ(w,x), by the induction hypothesis we
have g(z) = S′, a contradiction.
The next claim establishes the remaining case, where no vertex u 6∈ g(x), u 6= f(x) can change the sample
set.
Claim 3. Let (g, f) be an impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism, x be a nomination profile and
u a vertex with u 6∈ g(x), u 6= f(x). Then g(x) = g(x′u,x−u) for any other vote x′u ∈ N \ u.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some nomination profile x′ = (x′u,x−u) with
g(x′) = S′ 6= S. Starting from x′, we define a profile z′ in which all vertices in S′ vote for u, and the rest
vote as in x′. That is, z′v = u, for all v ∈ S′ and z′v = x′v otherwise. Clearly f(z′) = u, as all the sample
vertices vote for u. By Claim 2, we know that g(xu, z′−u) = g(z′) = S′.
Starting from x, we define a profile z in which all vertices in S′ vote for u, and the rest vote as in x.
Since S′ 6= S = g(x), by Lemma 4, we get g(z) 6= S′. Observe that z = (xu, z′−u), which leads to a
contradiction.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
We next use Theorem 3 to obtain lower bounds on the additive approximation guarantee obtained by
deterministic and randomized strong sample mechanisms respectively.
Corollary 1. There is no impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism with additive approximation
better than n− 2.
Proof. Let S be the sample set which, by Theorem 3, must be selected independently of x, and let v ∈ S.
Define x so that all vertices in N \ v vote for v and all other vertices have in-degree either 0 or 1. Then,
∆(x) = n− 1, but the mechanism selects vertex xv of in-degree exactly 1.
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We remark that the strong sample mechanism that uses a specific vertex as singleton sample achieves this
additive approximation guarantee. We next provide a lower bound on the additive approximation guarantee
of randomized strong sample mechanisms, which shows that RANDOM k-SAMPLE (with k = Θ(
√
n); see
Section 3.1) is an optimal mechanism from this class.
Corollary 2. There is no impartial randomized strong sample mechanism with additive approximation better
than Ω(
√
n).
Proof. By Theorem 3, any impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism selects its sample S indepen-
dently of the graph. Hence, any impartial randomized strong sample mechanism decides its sample with a
probability distribution over all possible sample sets S ⊆ N , independently of the graph. We examine two
cases for this probability distribution.
If there is a vertex u∗ with Pr [ v ∈ S ] ≥ 1/√n, then consider a nomination profile consisting of vertex
u∗ having maximum in-degree ∆ = n − 1 (i.e., all other vertices are pointing to it), with all other vertices
having in-degree either 1 or 0. Since u∗ belongs to the sample (and, hence, cannot be the winner) with
probability at least 1/
√
n, the expected degree of the winner is at most 1+(n−1)(1−1/√n) = ∆−Θ(√n).
Otherwise, assume that every vertex v has probability at most 1/
√
n of being selected in the sample set.
Consider a nomination profile with a vertex u∗ having maximum degree ∆ =
√
n/2 and all other vertices
having in-degree either 0 or 1. Consider a vertex u pointing to vertex u∗. The probability that u belongs to the
sample is at most 1/
√
n. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that some of the
√
n/2 vertices pointing
to u∗ is selected in the sample set is at most 1/2. Hence, the probability that u∗ is returned as the winner is
not higher than 1/2 and the expected in-degree of the winner is at most 1 +
√
n/2 · 1/2 = ∆−Θ(√n).
4.2 General Lower Bound
Our last result is a lower bound for all deterministic impartial mechanisms in the most general model of
Alon et al. [1], where each agent can nominate multiple other agents or even abstain. We remark that our
current proof applies to mechanisms that always select a winner.
Theorem 4. There is no impartial deterministic α-additive mechanism for α ≤ 2.
Proof. Let f be a deterministic impartial mechanism and, for the sake of contradiction, assume that it
achieves an additive approximation of less or equal to 2. We will show that there is a profile with four
vertices (denoted by a, b, c and d), in which the winner has in-degree 0, while the maximum in-degree is 3,
which leads to a contradiction.
We first consider the profile with no edges, say s, and let us assume, without loss of generality, that the
winner is a (see Figure 3). Now consider the three profiles x, y and z produced when each of the other three
vertices c, b and d vote for the other two of them, respectively (c votes for d and b, b votes for c and d, and d
votes for b and c, as shown in Figure 3). In all these profiles, the voter cannot be the winner since this would
break impartiality. Focus for example on the profile x. Since c cannot be the winner, it must be either a, b
or d. There are essentially two cases (due to symmetry), which we treat separately.
Case 1: a is the winner for at least one of x,y, z. Consider the profile x, where vertex c votes for
both b and d and assume that a = f(x) (see Figure 4). We let a vote for both b and d, to get the profile
w = ({(a, b)(a, d)},x−a). Impartiality implies that a = f(w).
On the one hand, if b votes for d (profile w′ = ({(b, d)},w−b)), impartiality implies that b 6= f(w′) and
approximation allows only f(w′) = d. On the other hand, if d votes for b (profile w′′ = ({(d, b)},w−d)),
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a b
c d
(s)
⇒
a b
c d
(x)
a b
c d
(y)
a b
c d
(z)
Figure 3: Vertex a is the winner in profile s. This lead to the three profiles x, y and z, where the diamond
vertex cannot be the winner.
by similar arguments we have f(w′′) = b (see Figure 4). Now, consider the profile t where both b and d
vote for each other, i.e., t = ({(d, b)},w′−d) and, at the same time, t = ({(b, d)},w′′−b). Impartiality
(applied to w′ and w′′, respectively) implies that both b and d must be winners which is absurd and leads to
a contradiction. Similar arguments would apply for the other cases, establishing that a cannot be the winner
in any of the profiles x,y or z.
a b
c d
(x)
⇒
a b
c d
(w)
a b
c d
(w′′)
a b
c d
(w′)
⇒
⇒
a b
c d
(t)
⇒
⇒
Figure 4: Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 4. We assume that a is the winner in profile x. When a adds
votes profile w is created. Then, in the upper profile w′, vertex d must win (for an additive approximation
guarantee strictly less than 3) and in the lower profile w′′, vertex b must win. This however leads to the final
profile t, where both d and b must win, due to impartiality —a contradiction.
Case 2: a is not the winner for any x,y, z. In this case, due to impartiality, only vertices with in-degree
1 are possible winners. Hence, we are left only with two sub-cases; either two of these profiles share the
same winner or all of them have a different winner.
In the first case, consider (without loss of generality) the scenario where f(x) = f(y). Impartiality plus
the fact that a is not the winner imply that f(x) = d. Assume that f(z) = b (illustrated in Figure 5a). The
alternative case f(z) = c follows through similar arguments. In profile y, we let d add 2 votes and create
profile t′ = ({(d, b)(d, c)},y−d). By impartiality, f(t′) = d. In profile z, we let b add 2 votes and create
profile ({(b, c)(b, d)}, z−b) = t′. Note that these graphs are, indeed, the same. By impartiality f(t′) = b,
so t′ must award two vertices, a contradiction. Symmetric arguments hold in all the cases where two of the
profiles x,y, z share the same winner.
We are left now with the case where all these profiles, x, y and z have different winners, where none
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a b
c d
(x)
a b
c d
(y)
a b
c d
(z)
a b
c d
(t′)
⇒
⇒
(a) Same winner in profiles x and y.
a b
c d
(x)
a b
c d
(y)
a b
c d
(z)
⇒
⇒
⇒
a b
c d
(x′)
a b
c d
(y′)
a b
c d
(z′)
⇒
⇒
⇒
a b
c d
(t′′)
(b) Profiles x,y, z have different winners.
Figure 5: Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 4. Vertex a is not the winner in any of the profiles x,y, z. In
subfigure (a), we assume that two of the winners are the same, and this lead to a mechanism with two
winners —a contradiction. In subfigure (b), we assume that no two profiles among x, z,y have the same
winner. Impartiality implies that in the rightmost profile t′′ where three vertices have in-degree 3, the winner
has in-degree 0 —a contradiction.
of them is a. There are 2 possible such scenarios: f(x) = d, f(y) = c and f(z) = b (see Figure 5b), or
f(x) = b, f(y) = d and f(z) = c. Consider the first one (similar argument hold also for the second). From
these profiles x, y and z we reach the profiles x′ = ({(d, b)(d, c)},x−d), y′ = ({(c, b)(c, d)},y−c) and
z′ = ({(b, c)(b, d)}, z−d), by letting the respective winners to add edges. Because of impartiality, all the
winners are preserved, i.e., f(x) = f(x′), f(y) = f(y′) and f(z) = f(z′). Let us now focus on profile x′.
By letting vertex b add edges (b, c) and (b, d), we create the profile t′′ = ({(b, c)(b, d)},x′−b): a directed
clique on the vertices b, c and d and the vertex a with no incoming nor outgoing edges (see Figure 5b).
Focusing now on profile y′, we reach the profile ({(d, b)(d, c)},y′−d) = t′′ by a deviation of vertex d; the
same profile as before. In a similar fashion, on profile z′ we reach the profile ({(c, b)(c, d)}, z′−c) = t′′ by
a deviation of c. By impartiality, f(t′′) /∈ {b, c, d}, which implies that f(t′′) = a. Now, if a votes for at
least any other vertex, impartiality implies that a must remain the winner, while the nominees of a will have
in-degree 3, contradicting the approximation guarantee of f .
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